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OPEN WINDOW:
MATTER OF LOVO’S IMPLICATIONS FOR
TRANSSEXUAL AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES
By Grisella Martinez, Esq.*

A

valid marriage was defined under federal law in the
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in
1996,1 as one between a man and a woman. Many legal advocates recognized this legislation as a door slamming shut
the possibility of legal recognition of same-sex marriages. However, the DOMA failed to define the terms “man” and “woman.”
Presumably this omission occurred because federal legislators
and America’s heterosexual dominant culture did not contemplate scenarios involving men and women who had undergone
sexual reassignment. Congress’ failure to define these terms
opened a window where marriage between a man and a postoperative transsexual woman,2 or vice-versa, could be classified
as a valid marriage under federal law, thereby providing a basis
for conferring immigration and other federal benefits. The
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmed this basis for
immigration benefits in Matter of Lovo, which firmly established
immigration benefits could be conferred on a spouse in a marriage where the other spouse was a postoperative transsexual.

MATTER OF LOVO: AN OVERVIEW
The BIA3 held in Lovo4 that the DOMA “does not preclude,
for purposes of federal law, recognition of a marriage involving a
postoperative transsexual, where the marriage is considered by
the State in which it was performed as one between two individuals of the opposite sex.” In addition, the BIA held that “a
marriage between a postoperative transsexual and a person of the
opposite sex may be the basis for [spousal immigration] benefits…where the State in which the marriage occurred recognizes
the change in sex of the postoperative transsexual and considers
the marriage a valid heterosexual marriage.” The Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”) states that U.S. citizens may file
beneficiary petitions for “alien relatives” who are “immediate
family members.” Immediate family members, who qualify as
“beneficiaries” of a petition, include spouses, as well as parents,
and children. The INA does not define who constitutes a
“spouse” for purposes of immigration law.
The petitioner in Lovo was a postoperative transsexual U.S.
citizen woman who married a male citizen of El Salvador. The
couple wed in North Carolina, and the petitioner subsequently
filed a visa petition for her husband so that he could apply for
lawful permanent resident status and acquire his “green card.”
The petitioner provided the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“the Service”) with: 1) her North Carolina birth
certificate showing her sex as “female;” 2) an affidavit from her
physician attesting to her sexual reassignment surgery; 3) a
North Carolina court order demonstrating her change of name;
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4) her North Carolina marriage certificate; and 5) her North
Carolina driver’s license showing her name and her current sex
as a female.
During its investigation, the Service discovered that the Petitioner was born a male in North Carolina, and had undergone
sexual reassignment surgery to become a female. The Service
erroneously denied her visa petition stating that a valid marriage
for purposes of immigration law was a federal question; therefore, her marriage was invalid because it was not between one
man and one woman. The Service found that the beneficiary
was ineligible for immigration benefits as a spouse. The petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the BIA.
On appeal, the BIA stated that its analysis involved
“determining first whether the marriage is valid under [s]tate law
and then whether the marriage qualifies under the [Immigration
and Nationality] Act.”5 The BIA concluded that under the statutory laws of North Carolina,6 a valid marriage is one between a
male and a female (although these terms were undefined in the
statute) and that the law expressly prohibited same-sex marriages. The BIA also discussed provisions of North Carolina’s
statutes that set forth requirements for amending birth certificates.7 These statutes explicitly permit the changing of an individual’s sex on the birth record after sexual reassignment surgery
and when proof of such surgery is provided from a licensed physician. Based on these facts, the BIA determined that the petitioner and beneficiary had entered into a valid marriage under
the laws of the State of North Carolina.
The BIA next addressed the second issue of whether the
marriage qualified as a valid marriage under current immigration
law. It noted the absence of any language in the INA defining
“spouse” and the failure of the DOMA to elaborate on the definition of “spouse” other than to state that “the word ‘spouse’ refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”8
The BIA also closely examined the failure of the DOMA and
federal law to address the specific issue of postoperative transsexuals entering into marriage. In addressing this failure, the
BIA looked to several sources of statutory construction and interpretation including the text of the DOMA, its legislative history,
and relevant case law.
Citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,9 the BIA followed the well-settled canon of statutory construction that “if the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, as we clearly ‘must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”
It found that the legislative history and plain text of the DOMA
clearly applied to marriages between a man and a woman and not
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to same-sex couples. It also found that the House Committee tation and removal proceedings involving transsexual immiConference Report used the terms “same sex” and “homosexual” grants. On a broader scale, this holding is significant because it
interchangeably and repeatedly addressed the repercussions of suggests that other agencies within the federal government may
allowing homosexual couples to marry. The BIA highlighted the recognize the validity of transsexual marriages in conferring fedfact that Congress never addressed the issue of marriage by post- eral benefits on spouses.
operative transsexuals in any legislative proceedings and found
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS
this failure to be remarkable in light of various state statutes recThe full implication of Lovo has yet to be established. To
ognizing transsexual marriage.10 The BIA held that:
date, the Service has not adjudicated Lovo’s petition on remand
[T]he legislative history of the DOMA indicates that
in enacting that statute, Congress only intended to
from the BIA, but in theory, the Service cannot deny the petition
restrict marriages between persons of the same sex.
solely because the petitioner or beneficiary is a transsexual.
There is no indication that the DOMA was meant to
However, this does not preclude the Service from denying the
apply to a marriage involving a postoperative transvisa petition on other grounds. The most relevant example of
sexual where the marriage is considered by the State
this situation is the case of Donita Ganzon (a U.S. citizen Filiin which it was performed as one between two indi11
pino male to female transsexual) and her husband Jiffy Javellana
viduals of the opposite sex.
(a Filipino male immigrant).
Of even greater interest is the
Donita Ganzon immigrated to the
BIA’s conclusion that Congress did not
...in
theory,
the
Service
cannot
United States in the 1970s. In 1981,
intend to overrule long-standing case
she underwent sexual reassignment
law that provides for state dominion in
deny the petition solely because
determining the validity of marriage.
the petitioner or beneficiary is a surgery. Subsequently, she legally
changed her name and sought recogniThe BIA held that the recognition of
transsexual.
tion of her sex change through the Calisuch a marriage deemed valid under
fornia state courts. The state of Califorstate law did not require Congressional
nia issued her a California driver’s license and allowed her to
authorization for the purposes of immigration.12
However, the Service argued against this interpretation and change her nursing license to reflect her sex as female.17 When
asked the BIA to give the terms “man” and “woman,” as used in she became a U.S. citizen six years later, her Certificate of Citithe DOMA, their “common meaning” when evaluating the valid- zenship listed her current name and her sex as female. In addiity of a marriage. Arguing that chromosomal patterns conclu- tion, the United States State Department issued her a passport
sively established “sex” because of their immutability, the Ser- which listed her sex as female.
vice contended that females with XX chromosomes and males
In 2000, Ms. Ganzon met Jiffy Javellana in the Philippines.
with XY chromosomes could never change their sex, even if they Approximately one year later she filed a fiancé visa for him with
underwent sexual reassignment surgery. The BIA rejected this legacy INS18 and he entered the United States. They married in
argument, citing the great debate within the medical community Nevada a few months later.19 During their interview with the
concerning determinations of an individual’s sex.13
Service for Mr. Javellana’s green card, Ms. Ganzon revealed that
Additionally, the BIA also recognized that not all individu- she was a transsexual. Shortly thereafter, the Service denied her
als are born with strictly XX or XY chromosomes and that “[a] husband’s application for permanent resident status based on the
chromosomal pattern [was] not always the most accurate deter- invalidity of his marriage to Ms. Ganzon. The couple filed suit
mination of an individual’s gender.”14 Furthermore, the BIA in U.S. District Court for the Western Division of California20
declared an individual’s original birth certificate did not provide seeking a declaratory judgment against the Department of Homean accurate method for determining gender. The “incongruities” land Security. While the suit was pending, Mr. Javellana filed a
and “ambiguities” in medical criteria for determining a person’s second application for adjustment of status and hoped that the
sex using purely physical markers at birth supported this find- BIA’s ruling in Lovo would preclude the Service from denying
ing.15 The BIA ended its analysis by reaffirming its position him a green card based on the alleged invalidity of his marriage
that, “for immigration purposes,” it is appropriate to use a cur- to a transsexual. In October 2005, the Service d5enied Mr. Javellana’s application “in the exercise of discretion,” stating that
rent birth certificate “to determine an individual’s gender.”16
Ms. Ganzon and Mr. Javellana had failed to prove that they enRECOGNITION OF THE ABILITY TO CONFER IMMIGRATION tered into their marriage in good faith and that the marriage was
BENEFITS ON A TRANSSEXUAL SPOUSE AS A TWO-FOLD “bona fide.”21
PRECEDENT
This case illustrates how future effects of Lovo have yet to
be
realized
in the context of visa petitions and adjustment appliLovo raises many issues, not only for the transsexual immigrant community, but the greater transsexual community at large. cations. It remains to be seen whether the Service will grant the
The primary importance of the BIA’s holding is that the Depart- petition or deny it on another “discretionary” ground. Regardment of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice are less of the outcome, Lovo endures as precedent in immigration
bound by this precedent in adjudicating visa petitions and depor- law and potentially allows transsexual spouses to claim immigraSpring 2006
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tion benefits in other contexts aside from family-based visa petitions. Under Lovo, the opportunities for transsexual spouses to
claim immigration benefits extend to employment-based visa
petitions, non-immigrant visa petitions, asylum applications, and
deportation and removal proceedings.
For example, aliens sponsored for an immigrant visa by a
United States employer may also file for derivative permanent
resident status for their spouses and children. Again, as with
family-based immigrant visas, there is no definition of “spouse”
and the couple need only prove that they entered into a valid and
bona fide marriage. Lovo also potentially applies to visa petitions for non-immigrants. This includes applicants for student
visas, employment visas, diplomatic visas, and other special
non-immigrant visa categories. As long as a benefit is given to
the visa holder’s spouse it could appropriately be considered
under the BIA’s ruling. Likewise, an alien filing for asylum, if
granted, may also pass on benefits to qualifying “derivatives.”22
In the case of a spouse, the only requirement for the spouse to
receive benefits based on asylum (such as permanent resident
status) is that the asylee married their spouse prior to receiving a
grant of asylum.
In deportation and removal proceedings,23 an immigrant
may request various forms of relief from removal based on marriage to a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident. For example,
when an “out-of-status”24 alien has continuously remained in the
United States for over ten years, the alien may request cancellation of removal based on “extreme hardship” to the U.S. citizen
or legal permanent resident spouse. Again, the statutes and
regulations25 discussing cancellation of removal do not define
“spouse” nor do they impose any other prerequisites on the marriage, other than it be bona fide. Therefore, it is possible, under
Lovo, that a transsexual spouse could claim or confer the benefit
of marriage as a basis for relief from removal.
To better illustrate this point, imagine the following: a U.S.
citizen male to female transsexual legally marries a male immigrant who is out-of-status. He has resided in the United States
continuously for over ten years prior to the commencement of
his removal proceedings. They have two adopted minor U.S.
citizen children, but have no other immediate or extended family
members in the United States. The U.S. citizen wife does not
work and the husband is the sole source of financial income for
the entire family. They own real property together and various
other assets. Under this set of facts, the Immigration Court is
bound by the determination of the BIA in Lovo to allow the husband to apply for cancellation of removal based on extreme
hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse and children. Although the
grant of the application is still a discretionary decision made by
the immigration judge, the husband could not be precluded from
applying for cancellation of removal before the Court based on
an “invalid” transsexual marriage. In addition, if the judge denies the application, the husband could appeal to the BIA, which
would have the power to remand the case to the Immigration
Court for a decision consistent with its holding in Lovo.
Therefore, the extent to which the BIA’s holding in Lovo
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affects transsexual spouses has yet to manifest before the Service or the Immigration Court. The uncertainties involved in the
ability of transsexual spouses to confer benefits as U.S. citizens
or to receive them as immigrants has great potential for litigation in federal courts and before administrative agency adjudicatory bodies.
FEDERAL BENEFITS
If the DOMA does not preclude a transsexual spouse from
conferring an immigration benefit on their legal spouse, then it
follows that it would not preclude any transsexual spouse from
conferring any federal benefit on their legal spouse. This conclusion stems from the implication, drawn from Lovo, that a
valid marriage under state law where a spouse is transsexual
may serve as the basis for receiving or conferring federal benefits on the other spouse, regardless of the DOMA.
The arena of federal health benefits is a prime example of
the potential benefits for married couples. The federal government currently employs more than two million people.26 The
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), the self-proclaimed
“human resources agency” of the government is responsible for
administering the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program
(“FEHB”) and several other benefits programs.27
Under the FEHB Program, federal employees and their family members are eligible for health coverage. The enacting statute for the FEHB states that a “‘member of family’ means the
spouse of an employee” as well as certain categories of children.28 The statute does not provide a definition of the term
“spouse.” The accompanying regulation offers no further clarification other than to state that the term “member of family” has
the meaning set forth in the statute given above.29 Aside from
the applicable statute and regulations, the only other source of
guidance is the FEHB Handbook which reiterates that “[f]amily
members eligible for coverage under your self and family enrollment are your spouse (including a valid common law marriage
[in accordance with applicable state law]) and children.”30
There are no publicized cases where a federal employee
attempted to confer health benefits on a transsexual spouse or
where a transsexual federal employee attempted to confer benefits on a spouse. There is no reliable data on how many transsexuals are residing in the United States,31 but probability dictates that someone will inevitably raise a claim based on the
ability to confer federal benefits to a spouse, in which one of the
parties is a transsexual. The OPM does have an adjudicatory
board (the Merit System Protection Board) for handling various
administrative issues, but they do not review health benefit issues.32 Under the FEHB’s enacting statute “[t]he district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, concurrent with
the United States Court of Federal Claims, of a civil action or
claim against the United States[.]”33 Therefore, the federal employee would have the right to file an action against the government in federal court immediately.
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CONCLUSION
Lovo opens the door to analyzing multiple types of potential
“federal benefits” conferred on transsexual spouses, including,
but not limited to, Social Security, tax and veterans benefits.
However, the factual dynamics of Lovo are very narrow and
may raise other issues that potentially complicate the rights of
those who do not fall into the same category. This is because
Lovo did not contemplate the numerous other possible permutations of transsexual marriage. The BIA did not identify the possible outcomes if both spouses had been transsexuals. It also did
not take into account for the marriage of a transsexual woman to
a biological man.34 Nor did it consider the applicability of its
ruling to transsexuals trying to confer benefits but whom were
unable to legally change their sex, were married in states that

did not legally recognize changes of sex, or were already married prior to having sexual reassignment surgery. Therefore,
while the BIA clearly recognized that there were potentially
“anomalous results” in refusing to recognize legal changes of
sex, the BIA did not fully address the consequences of its holding on a broader scale.35
In the final analysis, Lovo is an important and precedential
case not only in the immigration context, but also as a step forward for the transsexual community as a whole. Although the
DOMA closed an important door for the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgendered community, the BIA’s holding in Lovo seems
to have opened a window in the fight for transsexual rights. It
will take time and litigation in both the administrative and judicial arenas to determine exactly how far these rights extend.
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